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Appellate Practice and Procedure
By Tommy Day Wilcox*
There were a number of significant cases decided by the appellate courts
of Georgia during the past survey year in the area of appellate practice and
procedure. The Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals
handed down more than sixty opinions that turned in part on a consideration of the Appellate Practice Act of 1965, the rules of the appellate
benches, and the case law which has evolved under these standards. The
most noteworthy of these cases will be highlighted here under four general
headings: Enumeration of Errors; Payment of Costs and Transcripts; Final
Judgments; and Miscellany.
Unlike the activity in the case law area of appellate practice, the past
year was marked by an absence of any legislative enactments and a lack
of any significant changes in the rules of either the Georgia Supreme Court
or the Georgia Court of Appeals. Whether this development indicates a
general satisfaction of the courts and the bar with the Appellate Practice
Act of 1965, as amended, and the present rules, remains to be determined.
I.

ENUMERATION

OF ERRORS

Rule 14(a) of the rules of both appellate courts provides in part:
(a) Time of filing - the enumeration of errors shall be filed with the
clerk of this court within 20 days after the case is docketed in this office
... . Failure to file the enumeration of errors within the time specified
in these rules shall subject the offender to contempt. Failure to comply
with with an order of this court directing the filing of the enumeration of
errors shall cause the appeal to be dismissed.)
In most instances where the enumeration of errors is not filed within the
20-day period, the court, by order, gives the appellant additional time to
perfect his appeal. However, if the enumeration of errors is not filed within
the period set out in the order the appeal will be dismissed. In Spencer v.
Young, 2 the appellant filed five days after the extension of time lapsed and
the court of appeals dismissed the appeal. A similar fate was met by the
appellants in Worthington Financial Services, Inc. v. Ivey,3 Perrin v.
* Partner in the firm of James, Shipp & Wilcox, Macon, Georgia. Mercer University
(A.B., 1965; J.D., 1973). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1.

GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4514 (Supp. 1975).

2.
3.

136 Ga. App. 108, 220 S.E.2d 465 (1975).
135 Ga. App. 577, 218 S.E.2d 640 (1975).
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McDonald,' and Brown v. State.
The opinions in the above noted cases were brief and are important to
the appellant practitioner only to the extent that they emphasize a continued response by the appellate courts to the tardy appellant, i.e., appeal
dismissed. One suspects, given this procedure in a number of cases in the
past, that the attorney for the appellant may have decided, with the concurrence of his client, that the appeal did not have any merit. The failure
to file the requested enumeration of errors was by design a means of ending
the appellate process. This approach or procedure, however, is not condoned by the courts, and practitioners should note well the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Pettiford v. State.'
In Pettifordthe appellant was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced
to six years in the penitentiary. Notice of appeal was timely filed by the
appellant's employed counsel on July 15, 1975, and the case was docketed
in the supreme court on September 19, 1975. No timely enumeration of
errors was filed and the court issued its order on October 9, 1975, directing
counsel to file the enumeration of errors by October 15, 1975. On November
24, 1975, the supreme court noted that counsel had neither filed an enumeration of errors nor a brief, found the attorney in contempt, and had his
name stricken from the roll of attorneys authorized to practice before the
Georgia Supreme Court. The court went on to review the merits of the
appeal and the lower court's decision was upheld.
Justice Ingram dissented insofar as the opinion held counsel in contempt
of court and disbarred him from practicing before the court. The thrust of
his dissent was that the lawyer was never ordered to show cause why this
action should not be taken and, therefore, was not given an opportunity
to be heard. This lack of due process was unjustified in Justice Ingram's
opinion. "I believe the essence of due process is fairness and that this
lawyer has not received it in this case." 7
Given the many decisions in the past where an appeal has been dismissed for lack of timely filing of enumeration of errors with no comment
about the lack of diligence on the part of appellant's counsel, one senses
that the attorney in the Pettiford case was singled out as an example. But,
the fairness doctrine and Justice Ingram's due process argument aside,
counsel for appellant in the future would be well advised to either file a
timely enumeration of errors or file a motion to dismiss the appeal.
The sufficiency of the enumeration of errors on appeal following denial
of a motion for summary judgment was considered by the Georgia Supreme
Court in Adams-Cates Co. v. Marler.8 The court granted certiorari in the
4. 234 Ga. 239, 215 S.E.2d 470 (1975).
5.
6.
7.
8.

236 Ga. 333, - S.E.2d (1976).
235 Ga. 622, 221 S.E.2d 43 (1975).
Id. at 623-24, 221 S.E.2d at 44-45 (1975).
235 Ga. 606, 221 S.E.2d 30 (1975).
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case after the court of appeals concluded that the higher court's earlier
decision in Weaver v. Whaley9 mandated a non-consideration of the merits
of the trial court's ruling where no enumerated error directly contested the
trial court's decision on the summary judgment motion. " The supreme
court clarified its decision in Weaver and set forth the following guidelines:
The correct rule with respect to the legal sufficiency of an enumeration of
error is that it "need be only sufficient to point out the error complained
of . . . ." Puckett v. Puckett, 222 Ga. 653 (151 S.E. 2d 767) (1966).
"[Tihe subect matter need be indicated only in the most general way,"
(Wall v. Rhodes, 112 Ga. App. 572 (1) (145 S.E. 2d 756) (1965)), and if
the error asserted is properly supported, as provided by the rules of the
appellate court, it should be considered on the merits."
In a similar case concerning the sufficiency of an appellant's notice of
appeal following the lower court's grant of defendant's motion for directed
verdict, the court of appeals citing Holcomb v. Gray stated:
It is the policy of both appellate courts in Georgia to attempt to avoid
dismissing appeals and to try to reach the merits of every case when it can
be done consistent with the mandate of the law. 13
In this same general area, the Georgia Court of Appeals served notice
that even though a timely enumeration of errors is filed, where the brief
in support of the enumeration of errors contains no accompanying reference to the record or transcript which would show that citations made in
the brief have any bearing on the case before the court, this failure will
constitute an abandonment and the enumerations will not be considered.
In the case under consideration, appellant's argument and citation of authority consisted of nothing more than quotations from three decisions of
the court of appeals on the general subject of adequate compensation and
consequential damages in a condemnation case." It is clear the appellate
courts expect something more.

II.

PAYMENT OF COSTS AND TRANSCRIPTS

Appellant's failure to pay the costs for preparation of the transcript and
record or file a pauper's affidavit in the lower court was the basis for two
adverse judgments during the survey year. '5 In each case the appellant
9.

233 Ga. 635, 212 S.E.2d 812 (1975).

10.

Adams-Cates Co. v. Marler, 135 Ga. App. 298, 217 S.E.2d 398 (1975).

11.
12.
13.

235 Ga. at 606, 221 S.E.2d at 31.
234 Ga. 7, 214 S.E.2d 512 (1975).
Johnson v. Daniel, 135 Ga. App. 926, 927, 219 S.E.2d 579, 580 (1975).

14. McCollum Mfg. Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 135 Ga. App. 815, 218 S.E.2d 926 (1975).
15. Elliott v. Walton, 136 Ga. App. 211, 220 S.E.2d 696 (1975) and Haynes v. City of Lake
City, 136 Ga. App. 112, 220 S.E.2d 33 (1975).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

attempted to salvage his appeal by filing an untimely pauper's affidavit
but to no avail. Both of these cases were civil in nature and the record was
not forwarded to the higher court in either action because the cost bill was
not paid. Dictum in one of the cases, however, indicates that the rule
continues to be that where the record is transmitted even though the costs
remain unpaid, the appellate court will consider the matter on its merits.'
Unfortunately, the appellants here were not the beneficiaries of such a
fortuitous occurrence.
In last year's survey article, the following language in Interstate Corp.
v. Appel" was praised as signaling a more liberal attitude on the part of
the supreme court with respect to reviewing the merits of a case even
though the record on appeal was incomplete.
In any event, we now hold that the Appellate Practice Act requires that
appeals from final judgments be determined on their merits if at all possible, and the absence in the appellate record of existing transcripts or
documents, available in the trial court, is not ground to refuse consideration of enumerated errors on their merits. In every case the appellee has
ample opportunity to designate anything in the record or the transcript
of the evidence that has not been designated by the appellant. We believe
that the ends of justice are better served by allowing the appellant or the
appellee to send up through the clerk of the trial court additional available
documents or transcripts8 that will enable the appellate courts to render
decisions on the merits.
Appel notwithstanding, there were a number of cases this past year that
were affirmed on appeal without a consideration of the merits of appellant's enumeration of errors because a copy of the transcript was not transmitted to the higher court." Appel, therefore, should not be read too
broadly and practitioners should continue to be alert regarding the timely
preparation and transmittal of a transcript and record. And, as the appellant in Savage v. Savagen learned, the duty of overseeing the preparation
and transmittal is on counsel for the appellant, not the clerk of the court.
Where appellant's only justification for failing to file a transcript on time
in the trial court is an alleged oral agreement with opposing counsel that
16. Elliott v. Walton, 136 Ga. App. 211, 212, 220 S.E.2d 696, 697 (1975).
17. 233 Ga. 649, 212 S.E.2d 821 (1975).
18. Id. at 651, 212 S.E.2d at 823; see also Wilcox, Appellate Practice and Procedure, 27
MERCER L. REV. 1 (1975).
19. Canon v. Canon, 236 Ga. 99, 222 S.E.2d 381 (1976); Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ga.
115, 218 S.E.2d 846 (1975); Taylor v. Whitmire, 234 Ga. 449, 216 S.E.2d 310 (1975); Herring
v. Herring, 134 Ga. App. 766, 216 S.E.2d 641 (1975); Diamond v. Chatham County Bd. of
Tax Assessors, 135 Ga. App. 645, 218 S.E.2d 657 (1975); Knighton v. FNB Financial Co., 134
Ga. App. 807, 216 S.E.2d 365 (1975); Johnson v. Clements, 135 Ga. App. 495, 218 S.E.2d 109
(1975); Herrell v. Biddy, 137 Ga. App. 9, 223 S.E.2d 23 (1975); and, Best Buy Hosiery of Ga.,
Inc. v. William Miller Associates, 134 Ga. App. 472, 215 S.E.2d 25 (1975).
20. 234 Ga. 853, 218 S.E.2d 568 (1975).
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the time for filing would be extended and the record does not show such
an agreement and no order extending the time for filing is entered, the
judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. This is especially true where,
as in Taylor v. Whitmire,2' counsel for appellee moves to dismiss and
denies there was any such agreement to extend the time. It is apparent
from a reading of the cases that extensions of time for filing the transcript
are easily obtained but, again, it is the duty of counsel for the appellant
to see that the order is obtained and entered in the record.
On the criminal side the Georgia Supreme Court clarified its earlier
decisions in McAuliffe v. Rutledge" and Cunningham v. State23 regarding
late filing of the transcript where the proceeding is criminal in nature.
These two opinions held that the appellate court should entertain and
decide a criminal appeal on its merits even though counsel for the appellant had either failed to have the transcript transmitted or did so in an
untimely manner. The theory was the criminal defendant had been ineffectually represented by counsel at trial. Of course, when the appellate court
grants an affirmance of the conviction on reviewing the merits of the case
the state has no interest in pressing its motion to dismiss the appeal. This
result is evidenced by the state's non-action in Ingram v. State.' However,
where the appellate court reverses the lower court conviction on review
after denial of the state's motion to dismiss the appeal, the state will not
be content.
This brings us to a consideration of Denson v. State.n The court of
appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's appeal on the
grounds of an inexcusable delay in transmitting the record to the appellate
court. The court of appeals considered itself bound by the supreme court
cases of McAuliffe and Cunningham. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals' decision on certiorari concluding that the middle
bench had misinterpreted and misapplied the higher court's decisions.2
The Denson decision limits the effect of McAuliffe and Cunningham and
warns defendants that inexcusable delay in filing the transcript will result
in dismissal of their appeals.
A person convicted of a crime in a trial court in this state is not entitled
to have his conviction reviewed as a matter of right by an appellate court.
He must pursue applicable statutory requirements. A convicted party can,
by his own conduct or by his conduct in concert with that of his attorney,
forfeit his appeal. 7
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

234 Ga. 449, 216 S.E.2d 310 (1975).
231 Ga. 745, 204 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
232 Ga. 416, 207 S.E.2d 48 (1974).
134 Ga. App. 935, 216 S.E.2d 608 (1975).
134 Ga. App. 876, 216 S.E.2d 606 (1975).
State v. Denson, 236 Ga. 239, S.E.2d
Id. at 240, S.E.2d at (1976).

-

(1976).
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A practice and procedure note for counsel for the appellee seeking to
have appellant's appeal dismissed because a transcript is not filed in a
timely fashion was offered by the Georgia Supreme Court in Gilman Paper
Co. v. James.2 In the past, case law dictated that counsel file a motion to
dismiss the appeal in the trial court and if an adverse ruling resulted a new
motion to dismiss the appeal had to be filed in the appropriate appellate
court. Authority for this procedure in the respective appellate courts was
found in McDonald v. Rogers29 and Gilmore v. State.3 0 The Gilman Paper
case overrules the prior decisions, and now the procedure for appellees
seeking dismissal of an appeal for a tardy filing of the transcript by the
appellant is to appeal the trial court's judgment directly rather than submitting a new motion to dismiss.

III.

FINAL JUDGMENTS

Is a final judgment assessing attorney's fees during the discovery stage
of a case sufficient to support an appeal? Yes, and then, no. The court of
appeals in the April term concluded that an appeal would be proper 3' and
then in the September term overruled its earlier pronouncement.32 The
prevailing opinion reasoned that an order for attorney's fees incurred in
responding to interrogatories or depositions is an interlocutory order and,
therefore, subject to the provisions of the Appellate Practice Act of 1965
relating to certificates of immediate review. In other words, ". . . the cause
is still pending on its merits and requires a certificate of review to be
viable." Judge Deen admits, nevertheless, that the judgment as to attorney's fees is final as to one material party in the proceeding, i.e., the
attorney. 3 There was a six page dissent, so there is hope.
The appellate courts continue to hold that denials of motions to set aside
dismissals of complaints3 5 and motions to vacate judgments 36 are not final
judgments from which appeals may be had and they cannot toll the time
for filing an appeal. The order dismissing the complaint and the judgment
under attack are the key rulings and both start the time running for the
filing of a timely notice of appeal.
On two occasions during the most recent survey period, appeals were
taken following oral pronouncements of rulings and on each such occasion
the appellate court refused to consider the appeal. 37 There was simply
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

235 Ga. 348, 219 S.E.2d 447 (1975).
229 Ga. 369, 191 S.E.2d 844 (1972).
127 Ga. App. 249, 193 S.E.2d 219 (1972).
Marchman v. Head, 135 Ga. App. 475, 218 S.E.2d 151 (1975).
General Recording Corp. v. Chadwick, 136 Ga. App. 213, 220 S.E.2d 697 (1975).
Id. at 214, 220 S.E.2d at 698 (1975).
Id.
Azar v. Westview Cemetery, Inc., 134 Ga. App. 682, 215 S.E.2d 719 (1975).
Gresham v. John Roth Associates, 134 Ga. App. 691, 215 S.E.2d 538 (1975).
Crowell v. State, 234 Ga. 313, 215 S.E.2d 685 (1975); and In re Thomas, 134 Ga. App.
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nothing to appeal in that the judgment is not effective until it is signed
by the judge and filed with the clerk. Interestingly, one of these appeals
originated from a citation for contempt of court against the attorney who
3
in turn filed her own appeal.
There were fewer cases dismissed this past year because of the appealing
party's failure to obtain a certificate of immediate review. There continues
to be some confusion, however, regarding when a certificate is necessary.
The following appeals were dismissed as premature and, therefore, nonappealable absent a certificate of immediate review. Gordon v. Gordon,39
appeal from a judgment granting a new trial; Bouldin v. Mote,"0 appeal
from an order vacating and setting aside a default judgment; Trump v.
Scott Exterminating Co., 4 appeal from dismissal of plaintiff's action
where defendant's counter-claim is still pending; Spikes v. Carter Realty
Co. ,"2 and Mulligan v. Scott, 3 appeal from an order which adjudicates with
respect to fewer than all the claims or all the parties.
IV.

MISCELLANY

Perhaps the most significant decision during the most recent year was
Gillen v. Bostick44 which overruled the supreme court's earlier opinion in
Herrington v. Herrington." The Herrington case stood for the proposition
that even though a final judgment has been prepared and signed by the
judge, if the notice of appeal was filed before the judgment is actually filed
with the clerk, then the appeal must be dismissed." This ruling proved to
be a stumbling block for many unwary appellants. In the Gillen case the
final order finding appellant in contempt in a domestic case was dated
December 20, 1974, and the judgment was entered January 15, 1975. But
appellant's notice of appeal was filed January 7, 1975, before the entry of
the judgment, and under the rule in the Herrington case the appeal from
the court's order was subject to prompt dismissal. However, relying on a
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' case, Markham v. Holt, 7 and citing what
the court considered the spirit of 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 119,
§ 110.08(2) (1974), the court held that it had jurisdiction of the appeal. 8
This decision represents an enlightened approach to appellate practice and
728, 215 S.E.2d 735 (1975).
38. In re Thomas, 134 Ga. App. 728, 215 S.E.2d 735 (1975).
39. 236 Ga. 99, 222 S.E.2d 380 (1976).
40. 136 Ga. App. 73, 220 S.E.2d 79 (1975).
41. 135 Ga. App. 473, 218 S.E. 2d 149 (1975).
42. 136 Ga. App. 648, 222 S.E.2d 154 (1975).
43. 134 Ga. App. 815, 217 S.E.2d 307 (1975).
44. 234 Ga. 308, 215 S.E.2d 676 (1975).
45. 230 Ga. 94, 195 S.E.2d 654 (1973).
46. Id.
47. 369 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1966).
48. Gillen v. Bostick, 234 Ga. 308, 310-11. 215 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1975).
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procedure and certainly would seem to be in accord with Section 23 of the
Appellate Practice Act of 1965 which provides that the Act should be
liberally construed so as to bring about a decision on the merits of every
case appealed. 9
While premature filers of notices of appeal were getting some relief,
counsel for appellants who filed their notice of appeal after thirty days
following entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of will
continue to have their appeals dismissed even though they filed within a
few days after the running of the thirty day requirement. In Lewis &
Sheron Enterprises,Inc. v. Great A&P Tea Co. ,1 the order complained of
was filed with the clerk on July 11, 1975, and entered on the clerk's "docket
sheet" on July 16, 1975. The notice of appeal was filed on August 14, 1975.
The court rejected appellant's argument that the thirty day period begins
to run from the time the judgment is entered on the clerk's docket and the
appeal was dismissed. Filing with the clerk a judgment signed by the
judge, not the clerk's subsequent entry on the docket, starts the applicable
thirty day limit. A concurring opinion laments that the court's decision
requires a lawyer to inquire of the clerk each and every day as to whether
a certain judgment has been filed and voices concern about how the clerk
finds time to transact the other business of his office if he is busily answering the lawyers who anxiously wish to know whether their judgment has
been filed in the clerk's office. The law ought to require, in this judge's
view, the trial judge to let counsel for all parties know the exact date he
signs the judgment and that the date for appealing should begin to run
from that date. Alternatively, the law should require the clerk to notify
counsel for all parties on the day when the judgment is filed with the clerk
by the trial judge." The result under the majority decision does appear to
be harsh and contrary to the spirit of the Gillen case noted above. The goal
should be to have each and every case decided on its merits rather than
dismissed on a technicality. In short, as the concurring judge in GreatA &P
Tea Co. reasoned, "There ought to be a law!" 2
After some decisions to the contrary both appellate courts now seem to
be in agreement that findings of fact and conclusions of law required by
Georgia Code §81A-152(a) are mandatory and the facts must be found
specially and the conclusions of law must be stated separately or otherwise
the appeal will be remanded as in Hagin v. Powers.53 The court of appeals'
54
decision in Wiggins v. Darrah
indicates that this defect may be cured by
the trial court amending its judgment by adding findings of fact and conclusions of law before the case is presented to the higher court.
49.

GA. CODE ANN. § 6-905 (Rev. 1975).

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

136 Ga. App. 910, 222
Id. at 911, 222 S.E.2d
Id.
136 Ga. App. 395, 221
135 Ga. App. 509, 218

S.E.2d 659 (1975).
at 661 (1975).
S.E.2d 245 (1975).
S.E.2d 106 (1975).

